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The consequences of the crusades to the Holy Land and Egypt are many and varied. Increasingly 
historians are recognising that they played a central role in the development of medieval western 
Europe. It should be noted, however, that it is not always easy to discern the extent of the changes 
wrought by the crusades within evolving institutions, practices, and ideas. At the same time, there is 
little doubt that the crusades impact on inter-faith relations was largely negative. Contact, often 
aggressive, existed between Catholics, Muslims, Jews, and indeed Orthodox Christians long before 
the First Crusade (1095-99).  But the crusades increased the number and severity of the violent 
interactions between the different faiths, and the supposed memory of that violence is now used 
partly to justify bloodshed in the modern world.
    The Church’s support of sacral violence long predated preaching for the First Crusade. But the 
papacy did much more than merely offer their support for Christian Holy War in 1095 and indeed 
throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. By overtly associating warfare with the defence of 
the Church and Christendom, the papacy gave war a moral dimension that had been largely missing 
before the eleventh century, and it also accentuated the clergies association with violence. This may 
lie  behind the quasi-veneration  of  warfare  witnessed  in  later  centuries,  although the increasing 
identification of war as a product of God’s will probably helped create the ethical ideals of knightly 
combat. The interaction between crusading and chivalry was always likely given that both shared 
core values,  modes of thought,  and behaviour.  Crusading became viewed as a knightly service 
conducted for God, the ultimate overlord. This notion can of course be witnessed in the monastic 
orders,  but it  was also prominent in the proliferation of late medieval chivalric orders that had 
strong crusading affiliations. The impact of crusading in other areas of military life was not so 
significant. European castle design is now seen as a product of experiment and experience rather 
than  the  wholesale  borrowing  of  Levantine  architectural  designs.  Very few vital  lessons  learnt 
fighting in the Near East could be usefully employed against familiar western enemies. 
    Historians once maintained that crusading reinforced the papacy’s spiritual power and political 
authority. This now seems less likely: the Church had begun to centralise before 1095; the laity 
formed its own ideas about crusading; the papacy was not as influential in the lay world as was once 
thought; and the crusades were a massive drain on the papacy’s time and resources. Efficient papal 
systems of taxation, created to finance crusades, seem to have benefitted the local secular rulers for 
whom the money was actually raised rather than directly enriching the papacy. On the other hand,  
the creation of efficient, centralised governmental systems expedited the curia’s control over the 
Church.
    Crusades were also a substantial burden for secular governments, although again they seem to 
have contributed to the centralisation and legitimisation of monarchical authority. Kings advanced 
the means of gaining central control, supply, and finance in the pursuit of crusading, which in turn 
increased their spiritual and political authority. This should not be overstated: monarchs tended to 
build  on  existing  governmental  foundations  and kings  often  sought  to  legitimise  their  position 
through pious acts such as defending the Church and papacy. King Louis IX of France, however, 
ushered in far-reaching and radical governmental reforms in direct response to the failure of his first 
crusade (1248-52). 
    It was once thought the crusades ‘opened up’ the eastern markets and trade links to the Italian 
maritime powers. Italian activity undoubtedly increased in the eastern Mediterranean as a result of 
the  crusades.  Venice’s  prosperity  in  the  thirteenth  century  was  largely  a  product  of  acquiring 
Byzantine trading posts in the wake of the conquest of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade 
(1198-1204). But Italians were already trading with Constantinople and Alexandria before 1095. 
The conquered Syrian port cities failed to attract major investment until the latter half of the twelfth 
century. Even then they could rarely compete with Constantinople’s and Alexandria’s volume of 
trade. Interestingly though, the need for crusaders to raise cash might have influenced the evolution 
of Italian credit systems, and this may have in turn added to the liquidity of an increasingly active  
market.  The Italian mercantile  and banking companies  were certainly central  to  the transfer  of 
bullion and credit raised to finance crusades through papal taxes in the 1270s.
    Equally certain is the crusades impact on interfaith relations. Jews were the first victims of 
crusading zeal. The killing and robbing of European Jews was largely, although not entirely, an 
unintended product of the preaching for the first three numbered crusades. At different times the 
Jews were  identified  as  legitimate  targets  to  finance  expeditions,  and preachers  augmented  the 
crusaders’ personal  identification  with  Christ’s  suffering  on  the  cross.  Consequently,  crusaders 
targeted Jews as a means of obtaining ready cash and in pursuit of vendetta against the perceived 
killers of Christ. The Jewish communities’ ability to recover quickly is perhaps a reflection of their 
experiences at the hands of many Christians throughout the middle ages. Unfortunate as they were, 
the  attacks  in  1096,  1146,  and  1190 were  part  of  a  pattern  anti-Semitic  behaviour.  That  said, 
historians largely agree that the preaching for the crusades was an important factor contributing to 
the inauspicious position of many Jews in medieval society. 
    The crusades also had a detrimental affect on the relationship between the Catholic and Orthodox 
Churches. Byzantine theologians maligned Catholics even before 1095, and the contemporaneous 
geopolitical ambitions of the Normans in the Mediterranean exacerbated the negative perceptions of 
the Latin West. Armies on the first three numbered crusades suffered in numerous ways in Thrace 
and  Anatolia,  and  treacherous  Byzantines  were  usually  blamed  for  the  crusaders’ privations. 
Crusade historians now see the diversion to and subsequent sacking of Constantinople during the 
Fourth Crusade (1204) as the result of a series of ‘accidental’ occurrences. Nonetheless, the sacking 
is still viewed as a watershed that brought Catholic/Orthodox relations to a new low. The relations 
were outwardly healed by the reunion of the churches at the Council of Florence in 1439. By that 
time, however, the empire was on the verge of extinction; a powerful Byzantium would hardly have 
accepted the doctrine of papal primacy over the Orthodox Church. 
    Supposedly a legacy of folk memory, the crusades still loom large in the consciousness of much 
of the Muslim world. By the mid-twelfth century, the crusades in the Levant had led to the revival  
of  jihad in  the  region.  The  Mamluk military oligarchy finally  extinguished  the  last  bastion  of 
Outrémer (or the Crusader States in the East) in 1261, although crusades were then directed against 
the  Anatolian  Turkish  emirates  and  their  expansionist  Ottoman  successors.  Crusade  preaching 
sustained a negative image of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad throughout, although increased 
contact did lead to instances of mutual appreciation of the religious other. Muslims suffered greatly 
at the hands of crusaders, but the crusades were not anti-Islamic per se. Muslims became the targets 
of  crusades  because  they  occupied  and/or  threatened  Jerusalem,  the  perceived  seat  of  Christ’s 
patrimony,  the  most  sacred  city  in  Christendom  and  the  penitential  pilgrimage  centre  par 
excellence, and, perhaps just as importantly, the focus of Christendom’s eschatological goals. Most 
crusaders knew little of Islam and cared even less. 
    Similarly,  having  expelled  the  Christians  settlers  from the  Levant  in  1291 and then  being 
subsumed into a powerful Ottoman Empire that conquered considerably more territory than the 
crusaders, the Muslims of the Near East seem to have lost interest in the crusades and forgotten the 
violence of the Christians. Folk stories of legendary heroes of resistance such as the thirteenth-
century sultan Baybars continued to be told but  the tradition was hardly widespread. Very few 
eastern writers did more than just mention the crusades in passing right up until the 1860s. Faced 
with revolt  and imperial  disintegration in  the Balkans at  the end of the nineteenth century,  the 
Ottoman sultan,  Abdülhamit II, turned to pan-Islamism. To foster Muslim unity, he publicised his 
conviction  that  his  contemporary  European  imperialists  had  embarked  on  new  crusades.  Late 
nineteenth-century  Muslim  thinkers  took  note  and  looked  westwards  to  learn  more  about  the 
crusade movement. By this time, the campaigns had become a ‘civilising’ source of imperial pride 
for  many contemporary  Europeans.  Nineteenth-century  imperialists  began  borrowing  crusading 
rhetoric and imagery to describe non-pious, imperialist  ventures.  The idea of the crusade as an 
instrument of imperialism continued to be expressed; witness the popular imagery of returning, 
triumphant  crusaders  that  accompanied reports  of the British and French entries  into Palestine, 
Syria, and Lebanon during the First World War. Arab Nationalists writing in the years immediately 
following the war rejected the pan-Islamic ideas of the now defunct Ottoman Empire. But looking 
at the West’s contemporary depiction of the crusades, they likewise suggested to their audience that 
Europe,  having  lost  the  first  war  in  the  Near  East,  was  now  embarking  on  another  crusade 
movement. By the 1920s, the historiography of the movement had moved on and now the crusades 
were  popularly  seen  in  the  West  as  an  instrument  of  colonialism.  Consequently,  many  Arab 
Nationalists presented their struggle from the English and French mandates in the East as a riposte 
to ‘imperialist’ crusades. By the 1970s, militant pan-Islamism had successfully challenged Arab 
Nationalism and in doing so effectively globalised the Nationalist interpretation of crusade history. 
Unfortunately,  Muslim  scholars  still  tend  to  neglect  the  crusade  movement,  although  its 
historiography changed radically after the 1970s. Crusade historians now stress the pre-eminence of 
religious beliefs and values in explaining the origins and popularity of the crusades. However, in 
pursuit of a global Sunni caliphate, Islamic fundamentalists seemingly take little interest in modern 
crusade scholarship. They routinely refer to western powers as crusaders and al-Qaeda’s call for 
jihad against imperialist “crusaders” in 1998 has been repeated many times since.
    It is tempting to draw conclusions derived from geographical congruity or superficial political 
similarity, but as any student of the crusade movement is aware, modern geopolitical conflicts in the 
Near East or anywhere else for that matter are not a legacy of the crusades. The idea of crusaders as  
imperialists is a modern construct, as is the supposed collective, Near Eastern Muslim memory of 
the crusades. Stories of the Christians’ violence in the Holy Land and Egypt were not repeated 
throughout the ages: it seems to have been of little consequence after 1291. This was not the case in 
the West where the crusades were central to the continuing development of medieval Europe. They 
contributed to the Church’s militarisation and facilitated the curia’s control over that institution. 
They probably influenced warfare’s idealised ethics and helped legitimise monarchical rule. At the 
same  time,  the  crusades  expedited  the  centralising  tendencies  of  medieval  governments  and 
increased the Mediterranean trade and commerce of Italian maritime cities. Conversely, their impact 
on interfaith  relations  was entirely negative.  Anti-Semitism was a  feature of medieval  Catholic 
society, but the preaching for the crusades gave impetus to anti-Jewish hostility. 900 years after the 
first crusaders attacked Jewish communities, a number of Jews still seek apologies from the papacy 
and  indeed  from the  Catholic  world  for  the  crusades.  The  relations  between  the  Catholic  and 
Orthodox Churches were stretched before 1095. Subsequent contact exacerbated matters and the 
events of 1204 still resonate amongst a small population of Greek Orthodox Christians. 800 years 
after  the  Fourth  Crusade,  Pope  John  Paul  II  felt  compelled  to  apologise  for  the  sacking  of 
Constantinople. Nonetheless, the most apparent and certainly the most destructive consequence of 
the  crusades  derives  from a  tenuous,  Islamic  fundamentalist  interpretation  of  the  ‘imperialist’ 
crusade  movement.  Acquisitive  and  violent  most  certainly,  but  more  that  anything  else  the 
movement was an expression of belief and devotion, incredulous as that often sounds to the popular 
reader.  
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